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Nonexcessive remissions of foreign excise taxes under section 1303(a) of the Trade
Act of 1974: Zenith Radio Corp. v. United Statessl—The United States coun-
tervailing duty provision is intended to avoid unfair competitive advantages
that may arise when some nations bestow bounties or grants upon certain
items exported from these nations. In administering this statute, the Treasury
Department has exempted from the countervailing duty requirement remis-
sions by nations of their domestic excise taxes in an amount not exceeding the
amount of the taxes that would be imposed if sold in the country of manufac-
ture. The courts, on the other hand, have held that any remission of taxes is a
bounty, and therefore subject to the countervailing duty provision. In Zenith
Radio Corp. v. United States 2 the Supreme Court resolved the conflict between
the administrative and judicial interpretations in favor of the Treasury De-
partment practice. While this decision is laudable in that it represents a
proper interpretation of the present countervailing duty provision, the deci-
sion highlights the need for reform in this area of the law to better fulfill the
purpose of avoiding unfair competitive advantages in the sale of imported
and domestic goods. .
The Commodity Tax Law of Japan 3 imposes a single stage consumption
tax on Japanese consumer goods, including electronic products.' The
Japanese government levies the tax—calculated as a percentage of the sales
price—on the goods when they are shipped from the factory. If the goods
are exported from Japan, however, the tax either is not imposed or is re-
funded to the manufacturer. 5
The Zenith Radio Corporation, a United States manufacturer of elec-
tronic equipment whose goods are in competition with the imported Japanese
products, petitioned the Commissioner of Customs to declare the remission of
the Japanese tax on exported goods a "bounty or grant" within the meaning
of section 303, the countervailing duty provision of the Tariff Act of 1930. 5
The countervailing duty provision requires that whenever a bounty or grant is
bestowed by a foreign government on goods imported into the United States,
the Secretary of the Treasury must determine the amount of the bounty or
grant and levy a countervailing duty equal to that amount.' Arguing that the
' 437 U.S. 443 (1978).
2 Id.
3 Law No. 48 of 1962. Relevant provisions of the Japanese statute are con-
tained in the Unified Appendix to Zenith at 44-48.
4 Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 430 F. Supp. 242, 242 (Cust. Ct. 1977),
reed, 562 F.2d 1209 (C.C.P.A. 1977), aff'd, 437 U.S. 443 (1978). The electronic prod-
ucts covered under the tax law include television receivers, radio receivers, tape
players, tape recorders and phonographs. These products are taxed at rates which
range from 5% to 40% of the sales price. Id. at 242-43.
5 Id. at 243.
46 Stat. 687 (1930), as amended, 19 U.S.C.
	 1303(a) (1976). Zenith filed its
petition in 1970 pursuant to the provisions of § 303 of the Act. Zenith, 430 F. Supp. at
243.
7
 Section 303(a) of the Trade Act of 1974, L9 U.S.C. § 1303(a) (1976) pro-
vides in relevant part that:
(1) Whenever any country, dependency, colony, province or other
political subdivision of government, ... shall pay or bestow, directly or in-
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Japanese tax remittance procedure met this statutory requirement, the Zenith
Corporation requested the Treasury Department to assess a countervailing
duty on the Japanese products imported into the United States.' The Acting
Commissioner of Customs rejected Zenith's petition and issued a Final Nega-
tive Countervailing Duty Determination. 9
Following the Customs Commissioner's denial Zenith instituted an action
in the Customs Court to require the Secretary of the Treasury to impose a
countervailing duty." A three judge panel, relying on the 1903 Supreme
Court decision in Downs v. United States," ruled that the remission of any
indirect tax—a tax on the sale of the goods themselves—constitutes an im-
permissible bounty.' 2 Characterizing the Japanese tax as an indirect tax, the
district court concluded that the amount remitted constituted a bounty and
had to be subject to a countervailing duty.' 3 The court therefore directed the
Secretary of the Treasury to determine the net bounty, and to impose a coun-
tervailing duty equal to that amount on the imported goods."
On appeal, the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals re-
versed 15 the Customs Court ruling on the ground that the lower court had
directly, any bounty or grant upon the manufacture or production or ex-
port of any article or merchandise ... then upon the importation of such
article or merchandise into the United States, ... there shall he levied and
paid, in all such cases, in addition to any duties otherwise imposed, a duty
equal to the net amount of such bounty or grant, however the same be
paid or bestowed.
(5) The Secretary shall from time to time ascertain and determine, or
estimate, the net amount of each such bounty or grant, and shall declare
the net amount so determined or estimated.
Id.
8 Zenith's petition alleged that not only the remission of the Commodity tax,
but also other "Export Promotion Techniques" such as special depreciation allowances,
an overseas Market Cultivation Reserve, Financial Incentives, and an Export Insurance
System combined to create an impermissible bounty or grant. Unified Appendix at
139-50.
9 41 Fed. Reg. 1298 (1976). In his decision the Acting Commissioner stated
that the incentives alleged by Zenith "involve an aggregate amount considered to be de
minimus per dollar of value of the exported products." Id. The Acting Commissioner
ruled that this de minimus bounty was not subject to the countervailing duty provisions.
Id.
10 Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 430 F. Supp. 242 (Cuss.. Ct. 1977). This
action was brought pursuant to section 331(b) of the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C.
§ 1516(d) (1976). Section 331(6) of the Trade Act of 1974 provides a means of recourse
for domestic manufacturers dissatisfied with the Treasury's determinations. Accord-
ingly, if a domestic manufacturer's petition before the Treasury Department is denied,
the manufacturer may file for judicial review of the Treasury decision in the Customs
Court. The manufacturer must, however, first notify the Treasury Department of its
intention to so contest the decision. 19 U.S.C. § 1516(d) (1976).
" 187 U.S. 496 (1903).
12 430 F. Supp. at 248-49. .
13 Id. at 249.
14 Id. at 265.
15 Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 562 F.2d 1209, 1223 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
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construed the decision in Downs improperly." The appeals court found that
the language relied upon by the lower court, in determining that all remis-
sions of indirect taxes are impermissible, was broad dicta, and inconsistent
with the actual holding in Downs. The court therefore determined that the
language was not binding." Finding no legislative or judicial actions that
conflicted with the Treasury's interpretation of the countervailing duty provi-
sion, the appeals court upheld the Treasury determination 18
 that only exces-
sive remissions of indirect taxes need be countervailed.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari" and in a unanimous decision
HELD: The nonexcessive remission of an indirect domestic tax does not con-
stitute a "bounty or grant" within the meaning of the countervailing duty
statute. 2° The Court stated that the legislative history of the original 1897
countervailing duty provision makes clear that the Secretary's interpretation,
exempting a nonexcessive remission of indirect taxes from the countervailing
duty sanction, is at least a permissible interpretation, and one deserving great
deference." In addition, the Court noted that nothing in subsequent legisla-
tive or judicial considerations of the subject contradicts the Treasury interpre-
tation. 22
 Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals' decision."
The Zenith decision is significant primarily for its clarification of which
foreign taxes will trigger the countervailing duty provisions. By adopting the
Treasury Department's interpretation of the statute, the Zenith Court firmly
rejected lower court decisions that interpreted the statute as forbidding any
remission of indirect taxes. 24
 Furthermore, possible interpretations of prior
Supreme Court decisions as forbidding any such remission were rejected."
In rejecting these interpretations the Court clearly indicated that only exces-
sive remissions of indirect taxes will invoke the protection of the countervail-
ing duty provision.
While Zenith is proper in its coordinating the judicial and administrative
constructions of the countervailing duty provision, the decision nevertheless
points up the failure of the United States trade law to meet present trade
conditions. The United States trade law fails to deal with unfair trade advan-
IS Id. at 1212-13.
17
 Id. at 1212-15.
18
 Id. at 1222-23.
19
20
21
434 U.S. 1060
437 U.S. 443,
Id, at 450-55.
( 1 9 7 8).
449, 461-62 (1978).
22 Id. at 457-62.
2s
	 at 462.
21 E.g., United States v. Hills Bros. Co., 107 F. 107, 109 (2d Cir. 1901); Ameri-
can Express Co. v. United States, 332 F. Supp. 191, 197-200 (Cust. Ct. 1971), aff'd on
other grounds, 472 F.2d 1050 (C.C.P.A. 1973); Hammond Lead Products, Inc. v. United
States, 306 F. Supp. 460, 465-66 (Gust. Ct. 1969), rev'd on procedural grounds, 440 F.2d
1024 (C.C.P.A. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971); F. W. Meyers & Co. v. United
States, T.D. 24306, 6 TREAS. DEC. 260, 264-65 (Bd. Gen. App. 1903).
25 E.g., Nicholas & Co. v. United States, 249 U.S. 34, 39 (1919); Downs v.
United States, 187 U.S. 496, 515 (1903).
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tages that arise from the differences between direct and indirect tax systems.
By permitting the remission of indirect taxes, the present interpretation
favors those nations that, unlike the United States, place greater emphasis on
indirect taxes. A remission of indirect taxes, for manufacturers in these na-
tions, results in a greater overall reduction in taxes than in those nations
which have relatively minor indirect taxes. Accordingly, the Zenith decision
most certainly will lead to American manufacturer and producer pressure on
Congress and the Executive Branch for changes in domestic legislation and
for renegotiating the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade subsidy provi-
sions. 26 The implementation of these changes should work to improve the
present imbalances in United States trade relations.
This casenote will examine the Court's decision in Zenith in view of prior
legislative, administrative and judicial interpretations of the countervailing
duty statute. The requirements of the present countervailing duty provision
will first be examined. The casenote will next analyze and discuss the various
interpretations given to the countervailing duty provision by the Congress, the
Treasury Department and the Supreme Court. The note will then examine
the opinion in Zenith by considering the Court's treatment of prior legislative,
administrative and judicial interpretations. Finally, this note will consider the
implications of Zenith on United States foreign trade. It will be submitted that
although the Zenith court properly interpreted the present countervailing duty
statute, this interpretation does not achieve the statute's intended purpose of
eliminating unfair competitive advantages arising by means of government aid
of industries. Through this examination the need for reform of the present -
scheme will be shown.
I. THE LEGISLATIVE, ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL
ANTECEDENTS OF ZENITH
A. Scope of the Statutory Provisions
The countervailing duty provision is intended to ensure fair competition
between domestic goods and similar items imported from other nations. 27
The trade provisions contained in the United States trade laws and the Gen-
26 61 Stat. A5 (1947). Since. 1947, the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT), an agreement consented to by over 120 nations, including the United
States has sought to promote international trade by reducing protective barriers to
trade. Article VI(3) of the GATT, 61 Stat. A24 (1947), provides in relevant part that:
No product • .. imported into the territory of any other contracting party
shall be subject to ... a countervailing duty by reason of the exemption of
such product from ... taxes borne by the like product when destined for
consumption in the country of origin or exportation, or by reason of the
refund of such ... taxes.
Id.
" 30 CONG. REC. 318 (1897) (remarks of Representative Adolph Meyer of
Louisiana). In Zenith, the Court interpreted the countervailing duty provision in light
of its clear purpose to "offset the unfair competitive advantage that foreign producers
would otherwise enjoy from export subsidies paid by their governments." 437 U.S. at
456.
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eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade are premised on a model of interna-
tional trade that encourages competition between manufacturers of similar
products from different countries. The model presumes that manufacturers
will price their products competitively, and that manufacturing costs will de-
termine the amount of the prices. Ideally, the company and country which
enjoys a comparative advantage in a particular field and can produce the
product for the lowest cost will benefit from the competition and eventually
will dominate a substantial portion of the market for that product. If, how-
ever, the government of one nation subsidizes manufacturing costs of export-
ing companies, the free market. forces of comparative advantage will be dis-
rupted, and the subsidized exporter will have an unfair competitive advantage
over his unsubsidized counterparts in other countries. To offset this potential
unfair advantage, the countervailing duty provision provides that the Secre-
tary of the Treasury should determine the amount of any bounty or grant
bestowed directly or indirectly by a foreign government on•goods imported
into the United States." In the event of such a determination, the Secretary
is required to impose a countervailing duty on these goods equal to the net
amount of the foreign bounty or grant," returning the producers to the ideal
competitive model.
The implementation of the statute has not been as effective in dealing
with disparities in international trade as the model would suggest. In particu-
lar, the failure of the statute to define the terms bounty and grant has led to
confusion concerning whether rebates of foreign taxes will trigger the remedy
- of the countervailing duty provision. In determining . whether a bounty or
grant exists, a distinction has arisen between the remission of direct and indi-
rect taxes. Direct taxes are those imposed on the manufacturer of the goods
themselves. 3 0 Although the countervailing duty statute does not define the
meaning of the terms bounty or grant, it is generally accepted that the remis-
sion of a direct tax constitutes an impermissible bounty or grant, thereby in-
voking the countervailing duty sanction."
28 19	 § 1303(a) (1976).
29 1d.
3P
 In a press briefing on October 20, 1975, David MacDonald, Assistant Sec-
retary of the "Treasury for Enforcement Operations and Tariff Affairs defined these
terms as follows:
Direct taxes are those taxes which, theoretically, are imposed directly
upon the tax-paying entity, such as an income tax, or Labor/related type
taxes like the FICA.
Indirect taxes are assessed on the transaction, such as a sales tax or a
commodity excise tax, so that the transaction itself gives rise to the tax.
Unified Appendix at 80.
31
 Marks and Malmgren, Negotiating Nontariff Distortions to Trade, 7 LAW &
POCY INT't, Bus. 327, 350-51 (1975). [hereinafter cited as Marks & Malmgren]. The
remission of a direct tax is improper not only according to United States domestic law,
but also under Article VI(2) of the GATT, 61 Stat. A5, A23-24 (1947). Id.
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While direct taxes clearly come within the meaning of bounty or grant,
the inclusion of indirect taxes within the terms has been less clear. The stat-
ute's failure clearly to define bounty led to a conflict as to whether any indi-
rect tax remission or solely the excessive indirect tax remissions necessitate the
levying of a countervailing duty. An excessive remission, on the one hand,
would be a payment in excess of the tax that would be imposed if the goods
were sold in the country of manufacture. A non-excessive remission, on the
other hand, would be a payment that does not exceed the domestic indirect
taxes that otherwise would be imposed. Since 1898, the Treasury Department
has interpreted the statute as requiring countervailing duties solely for exces-
sive remissions of indirect taxes. 32 Opponents of the Treasury interpretation,
however, have contended that a proper interpretation of the statute would
forbid any remission of an indirect tax. 33
These conflicting interpretations presented the major issue for resolution
in the Zenith opinion. A brief examination of the legislative history of the
terms bounty and grant, along with an overview of the administrative action
and the pre-Zenith judicial review of that action will provide a backdrop for
the Zenith Court's analysis of this issue.
B. The Legislative Background
The Tariff Act of 1897,34 which contained the first generally applicable
countervailing duty provision, is the basis for the present trade law regarding
countervailing duties. Although the countervailing duty provision has been
reenacted five times since 1897, Congress has made no change in the relevant
language. 35 Therefore, the history and intent of Congress in enacting the
1897 statute remain relevant to ascertaining the Congressional intent behind
the terms bounty and grant.
The history of the 1897 statute includes two earlier limited countervailing
duty provisions. A countervailing duty provision was first enacted by Congress
in the Tariff Act of 1890. 3" This 1890 provision applied a fixed duty to
bounties bestowed on imported refined sugar." The statute did not define
32 E.g., T.D. 49355, 73 TREAS. DEC. 107 (1938); T.D. 43634, 56 TREAS. DEC.
342, 343 (1929); T.D. 20039, 2 SvNoPsis or DECISIONS 534, 535-36 (1898); T.D. 19729,
2 SYNOPSIS OF DECISIONS 157, 157-58 (1898).
33 This position has been advocated strongly by American manufacturers, who
rely for support on early Supreme Court decisions. E.g., Review of United States Trade
Policy: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Finance, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 564, 568-69
(1968) (statement of the National Livestock Feeders Association); id. at 887-89 (state-
ment of the United States Olive Producers and Importers).
34 Ch. 11, 30 Stat. 151 (1897).
35 Tariff Act of 1897, ch. 11, § 5, 30 Stat. 205 (1897), as amended by Tariff Act
of 1909, ch. 6, § 6, 36 Stat..85 (1909), as amended by Tariff Act of 1913, ch. 16, § 1V(E),
38 Stat. 193 (1913), as amended by Tariff Act of 1922, ch. 356, § 303, 42 Stat. 935
(1922), as amended by Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, § 303, 46 Stat. 687 (1930), as amended
by Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1976).
36 Ch. 1244, 26 Stat. 567 (1890).
37 Ch. 1244, Schedule E, § 237, 26 Stat. 584 (1890). Section 237 of the Tariff
Act provides in part that:
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the term bounty, leaving it doubtful whether the provision applied to all re-
missions or solely to excessive remissions of taxes. Although the 1890 section
was modified in the Tariff Act of 1894 38 to include language exempting
nonexcessive remissions of domestic indirect taxes from the countervailing
duty provision of the statute," the provision remained limited to bounties
bestowed on sugar.
In the precursor to the present statute—the Tariff Act of 1897 40 —the
countervailing duty provision was extended to all dutiable goods." At the
same time, however, the express exemption for nonexcessive remissions was
deleted from the new Act, leaving only language indicating that duties would
be equal to the "net" bounty. 42 This deletion of the definitional limit on the
term bounty thus raised the question whether Congress intended to carry
forward the 1894 definition, through the use of the word "net", or whether,
by dropping the express provision in the 1897 statute, Congress intended to
change the meaning of bounty to include any remission of indirect taxes.
The legislative history of each of these acts supports the view that Con-
gress intended to continue the excessive remissions meaning of the term
bounty. Although the original 1890 statute did not contain any express lan-
guage defining bounty, the congressional debates on the bill show that Con-
gress understood the term to refer to excessive remissions.' 3 In the 1894
All sugars above number sixteen Dutch standard in color shall pay a
duty of five-tenths of one cent per pound: Provided, That all such sugars
above number sixteen Dutch standard in color shall pay one tenth of one
cent per pound in addition to the rate herein provided for, when exported
from, or the product of any country when and so long as such country
pays or shall hereafter pay, directly or indirectly, a bounty on the exporta-
tion of any sugar ... , and the Secretary of the Treasury shall prescribe
suitable rules and regulations to carry this provision into effect.
Id.
38 Ch. 349, 28 Stat. 509 (1894).
25 Ch. 349, Schedule E,	 182 1/2, 28 Stat. 521 (1894). Section 182 1/2 im-
poses a countervailing duty of one-tenth of a cent for imported sugar receiving a
bounty from the country of export, provided that:
the importer ... may be relieved from this additional duty under such
regulations as the Secretary of the Treasury may prescribe, in case said
importer produces a certificate of said Government that no indirect bounty
has been received upon said sugar in excess of the tax collected upon the
beet or cane from which it was produced, and that no direct bounty has
been or shall be paid.
Id.
4° Ch. 11, 30 Stat. 151 (1897).
4 ' Id. § 5, 30 Stat. at 205.
42 Id.
43 See 21 CoNG. REC. 9529-32 (1890). Senator Gibson, a strong proponent of
the countervailing duty for sugar, attached to his comments an appendix containing
"The Bounty Systems in Europe" from Sugar and the Tariff by J. Alexander Lindquist.
These comments contained a discussion of the bounty systems in France, Germany and
Austria. In the discussion of each country's system the bounty is described in terms of
the excess over the remission of a domestic indirect tax. In speaking of the Austrian
system the discussion states that "On exports the domestic tax is remitted and a direct
bounty is paid of $6.30 per ton, and on refined of $9.04 per ton. But the amount of
money which can be paid in bounties is limited to $1,930,000, so that only 300,000
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Act, this policy was expressly incorporated into the language of the statute
itself. 44
Although the express language of the 1894 Act was eliminated in 1897, 45
the congressional debates reveal that no change in the meaning of the lan-
guage was intended. Senator Allison, the sponsor of the Senate amendment
favoring a generally applicable countervailing duty provision stated that while
the House provision containing the nonexcessive remission exemption was
being "stricken from the bill, the same paragraph in substance [was] being
inserted [in] section [5] making this countervailing duty apply to all articles
instead of to [sugar] alone."'& Indeed, Senator Allison considered the new
provision to be "only an imitation and an emulation" of the 1894 provision. 47
He stated that the contemplated meaning of the term bounty was "the net
bounty, less the taxes and reductions."'" In addition to Senator Allison's
statements, the figures used in debate indicate that the term bounty was in-
tended to refer to excessive remissions of taxes. Specifically, both opponents
and proponents of the Senate amendment spoke of the then existing German
sugar subsidization plan using figures only a fraction of the full amount re-
bated." The use of these figures would indicate that the Senators did not
consider all remissions to be bounties.
The early statutes and their legislative history thus reveal that Congress
intended to exempt non-excessive remissions of indirect taxes from the cover-
age of the countervailing duty provision. It is reasonable to assume that by
enacting a similar provision so shortly after the 1894 Act, and with no men-
tion of any dissatisfaction with the earlier provision, Congress intended no
change in the 1897 provision. Further, statements by the Amendment's spon-
sor indicate that the Amendment was to continue the then present policy. The
congressional intent of the original 1897 statute, therefore, should be inter-
preted as continuing the exemption from the countervailing duty provision
for nonexcessive remissions of indirect taxes.
C. Administrative Interpretations
The congressional intent bears on the question whether the provisions of
the statute are being properly enforced by the agency charged with its ad-
ministration. Congress has delegated responsibility for administering the
tons of raw or 213,000 tons of refined could receive the bounty; ..." 21 GONG. REC. at
9538 (1890).
44
 Ch. 349, § 182 1/2, 28 Stat. 521 (1894).
45
 When Congress was considering the 1897 act, the House passed and sent to
the Senate a slightly modified version of the 1894 sugar provision. 30 CONG. REc. 1634
(1897). The Senate, however, voted to adopt a new, generally applicable countervailing
duty provision. Id. at 2226. The proposed Senate amendment, agreed to by the House,
Id. at 2750, called for duties on "net" bounties, but did not include the House provi-
sion on nonexcessive remissions. It was through this change to broaden the coverage
of the provision that the express language exempting nonexcessive remissions was lost.
48 Id. at 1635.
47 Id. at 1719.
48 Id. at 1721.
" Id. at 2823-24.
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countervailing duty provision and determining the existence of bounties to
the Secretary of the Treasury. Consistent with the legislative intent, the
Treasury Department, since 1898, has interpreted the statute as exempting
nonexcessive remissions of indirect taxes." The Department has reasoned
that a failure to recognize this exception would result in double taxation on
imported goods. Double taxation occurs when imported goods are subject to
the indirect consumption taxes of the producing state as well "as the United
States federal, state and local excise or sales taxes. The Department has con-
cluded that this double taxation would place the imported products at an un-
fair competitive disadvantage with respect to American products." Since the
purpose of the countervailing duty statute is to eliminate unfair trade advan-
tages, the Department has concluded that interpreting the statute to result in
double taxation is impermissible, and only remissions in excess of the foreign
excise tax imposed ought to be subject to a contervailing duty.
The Treasury Department's interpretation, like the intent of the enacting
Congress, is highly relevant to a consideration of the meanings of bounty and
grant. Two factors emphasize the deference due to this administrative in-
terpretation. First, the Department provided Congress with the data used in
drafting the 1897 statute." By its participation in the enacting of the statute
the Department presumably would be in a strong position to interpret the
provisions in accordance with Congressional intent. In addition, the Treasury
Department interpretation is deserving of deference since the Department is
'° The Zenith Court noted that "ti]t is undisputed that the Treasury Depart-
ment adopted the statutory interpretation at issue here less than a year after passage
of the basic countervailing-duty statute in 1897, 	 , and that the Department has
uniformly maintained this position for over 80 years." 437 U.S. at 450. In a decision
dated July 26, 1898, the Treasury Department clearly stated its view that,
Where is a difference in the matter of appraisment and assessment of duty,
between a bounty and a remission of an internal revenue tax. Where a
bounty has been granted, a countervailing duty equal to the net amount of
bounty is levied and paid. The internal revenue tax remitted on exporta-
tion (unless excessive) is not held to be a bounty. When such a tax is.levied
and remitted on the exportation of the merchandise, no allowance is made
in the appraisement of the merchandise for such remission.
T.D. 19729, 2 SvNoPsis or DECISIONS 157, 157-58 (1898).
'' Executive Branch GATT Studies, Senate Committee on Finance, 93rd
Cong., 2d Sess. 17-18 (1974).
52
 Zenith, 437 U.S. at 456. In 1969 the Supreme Court, in Zuber v. Allen, 396
U.S. 168, a case involving a challenge by Vermont dairy farmers to the Secretary of
Agriculture's determination that dairies near Boston should be paid more for their
milk, stated,
[w]hile this Court has announced that it will accord great weight to a de-
partmental construction of its own enabling legislation, especially a con-
temporaneous construction, ... it is only one input in the interpretational
equation. Its impact carries most weight when the administrators partici-
pated in drafting and directly made known their views to Congress in
Committee hearings. In such circumstances, absent any indication that
Congress differed with the responsible department, a court should resolve
any ambiguity in favor of the administrative construction, if such construc-
tion enhances the general purpose and policies underlying the legislation.
Id. at 192.
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responsible for administering the statute and determining the existence of
bounties. 53 This responsibility should carry with it authority to interpret the
statute within a permissible scope. Even if the interpretation advanced by the
Department is not the only permissible one, it is at least a reasonable interpre-
tation calculated to further the legislative purpose of eliminating unfair ad-
vantage, and therefore, deserving great deference. These factors combine to
give great weight to the Treasury's interpretation.
D. Judicial Interpretations
1. Downs v. United States"
Despite the longstanding consistency between the legislative history and
the administrative construction of the countervailing duty provisions, pre-
Zenith judicial interpretations of bounty and grant are confusing and con-
tradictory. In a landmark decision, Downs v. United States," the Supreme
Court held that the Russian government had improperly encouraged the ex-
portation of sugar by remitting - the excise tax due on sugar if sold within
Russia, and by issuing certificates entitling producers to reductions in their
domestic excise tax equal to the value of the sugar exported. 56 The Court in
Downs rejected the importer's contention that the Russian scheme did not con-
stitute an impermissible bounty, and accordingly, found that this program
clearly invoked the sanctions contained in the Tariff Act of 1897. 57
Although the Downs Court held that the Russian scheme necessitated the
levying of a countervailing duty, confusion has arisen regarding the precise
holding of the Downs decision. On the one hand, the decision can be inter-
preted as holding that both aspects of the Russian scheme, the remission and
the certificates, constituted improper bounties." This interpretation focuses
on language in Downs that states:
53 In Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. I (1964), the Supreme Court stated that
"[wThen faced with a problem of statutory construction, this Court shows great defer-
ence to the interpretation given the statute by the officers or agency charged with its
administration." Id. at16.
54 187 U.S. 496 (1903).
" Id.
" Id. at 515-16.
57 Id. at 500, 516.
58 This interpretation of Downs has been most often advanced by the lower
courts. E.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 430 F. Supp. 242, 244-45 (Cust. Ct.
1977), rev'd, 562 F.2d 1209 (C.C.P.A. 1977), aff'd, 437 U.S. 443 (1978); American Ex-
press Co. v. United Stares, 332 F. Supp. 191, 197-200 (Cust. Ct. 1971), aff'd  on other
grounds, 472 F.2d 1050 (C.C.P.A. 1973); Hammond Lead Products, Inc. v. United
States, 306 F. Supp. 460, 465-66 (Cust. Ct. 1969), rev'd on procedural grounds, 440 F.2d
1024 (C.C.P.A.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971); F. W. Meyers & Co. v. United
States, T.D. 24306, 6 TREAS. DEC. 260, 264-65 (Bd. Gen. App. 1903). The Supreme
Court itself, in Nicholas & Co. v. United States, 249 U.S. 34, 41 (1919), read Downs as
holding the nonexcessive remission of indirect taxes to be a bounty under the Tariff
Act.
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When a tax is imposed upon all sugar produced, but is remitted
upon all sugar exported, then by whatever process, or in whatever
manner, or under whatever name it is disguised, it is a bounty upon
exportation."
If this language in the decision controls, then Downs held that any remission of
taxes, not merely an excessive remission, is an impermissible bounty. Despite
the deference due to an administrative agency's interpretation of a statute,
such as the one reached by the Treasury Department concerning indirect tax
remissions, this clear and contrary interpretation announced by the Supreme
Court in 1903 would contradict the Treasury interpretation and would re-
quire the courts to find all tax remissions to be covered under the statute.
On the other hand, the Downs decision may be read as finding only the
certificates for reduced domestic taxes, the second half of the Russian scheme,
to be impermissible bounties." Despite the above quoted broad language
from Downs, suggesting that all remissions are impermissible, the Downs Court
calculated the value of the bounty using figures equal only to the value of the
certificates." The use of these figures indicates that the Court followed the
excessive remission approach, the Treasury Department's interpretation. Ac-
cording to this interpretation the broad language in Downs that calls for a
duty on any remission of taxes is dicta, inconsistent with the actual holding
and not binding. Downs, therefore, may be read as exempting non-excessive
remissions of indirect taxes from the coverage of the countervailing duty stat-
ute and endorsing the longstanding Treasury practice.
Although the Court's assessment of the value of the bounty as equal to
the value of the certificates supports the excessive remission reading of Downs,
several other factors indicate that the Court did not intend this reading. First,
the Downs Court affirmed the lower court decisions that expressly found both
aspects of the scheme to be bounties. 62 Second, the amount of the bounty
39
 187 U.S. at 515.
so
	 commentators have interpreted Downs in this manner, Marks and
Malmgren, supra note 31 at 350; Butler, Countervailing Duties and Export Sudsidization: A
Re-emerging Issue in International Trade, 9 VA. J. INT'L LAW 82, 120 (1969), it was not
until the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals decision in Zenith that a court expressly
adopted this interpretation. 562 F.2d 1209, 1215 (C.C.P.A. 1977), aff'd, 437 U.S. 443
(1978).
" 187 U.S. at 514-16.
62 113 F. 144 (4th Cir. 1902). The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit's opinion expressly incorporated that rendered by the Board of General Ap-
praisers and affirmed by the district court. In so doing the court stated:
In affirming the decree of the court below, we also affirm the judg-
ment rendered by the board of general appraisers, whose opinion so fully
expresses our views and so ably presents the facts involved herein and the
law applicatable thereto, that we deem it entirely appropriate to adopt the
same as part of the opinion of this court.
Id. at 146. In the opinion, the Board of General Appraisers stated,
section 5 of the tariff act of 1897, under which this case arises, does not
use the word "bounty" in any narrow or technical meaning. It embraces
"any bounty or grant" bestowed or conferred by the Government, whether
directly or indirectly. The word "grant" is more comprehensive in meaning
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granted by the Russian government, determined by the Secretary of the
Treasury to equal the value of the certificate was not in issue in Downs, nor
was the Secretary's assessment contested by the importer." It is therefore
reasonable to assume that the Court in Downs, once it had decided whether
any bounty existed, merely used the figures agreed upon without passing
judgment on significance of the amount. The notion that the figures used in
Downs do not reflect an affirmative decision by the Supreme Court gains addi-
tional support from subsequent Customs Court decisions which uniformly cite
Downs as holding that the remission of any indirect tax is a bounty." Thus,
although the language in Downs does not completely preclude the possibility
of doubting that both aspects of the Russian scheme—the certificates and the
remission of taxes—were impermissible bounties, the more likely reading is
that Downs prohibits any remission of indirect taxes.
2. Nicholas & Company v. United States"
The Supreme Court also considered the applicability of the countervail-
ing duty statute to remissions of indirect taxes in 1919 in Nicholas & Co. v.
United States." In Nicholas, the Supreme Court held that certain allowances
bestowed by the British government on exporters of "spirits" were a pro-
hibited grant within the meaning of section 4 of the Tariff Act of 1913. 67
than the term "bounty." It implies the conferring by the sovereign power
of some valuable privilege, franchise, or other right of like character, ...
T.D. 2984, 4 TREAS. DEC. 405, 407 (Bd. Gen. App. 1901). The Board went on to state,
Our conclusion, therefore, is that a bounty or grant, ... has been paid
or bestowed by the Russian Government upon the exportation of this
sugar, so as to work a benefit or advantage to the Russian sugar exporter,
as follows:
First. Upon the exportation of the sugar, the Government remitted or
refunded the excise tax due thereon, or otherwise cancelled the indebted-
ness of the sugar manufacturer, so that he was enabled to place his prod-
uct upon the market free from the burden of either the regular or addi-
tional excise tax.
Second. The certificate which the Government issued to him upon the
exportation of his sugar had a substantial market value, and was transfera-
ble, and operated as a premium, grant, bonus, or reward.
Id. at 413.
63 4 TREAS. DEC. at 406; 113 F. at 146. The absence of a contest on the ques-
tion of the amount of the bounty is not surprising. The Treasury Department desired
only to countervail the excessive portion of the export scheme. Similarly, the importer,
Downs, had no interest in claiming that the figures used to assess a countervailing duty
against him did not encompass the entire bounty. Accordingly, the figures used reflect
the Secretary's decision, based as they were on the Department's interpretation of the
Act rather than the Court's determination that solely an excessive remission constitutes
a grant.
64 See cases cited in note 24 supra.
66
 249 U.S. 34 (1919).
" Id.
87 Id. at 35, 39-41.
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Britain paid its exporters three or five pence per gallon on exported alcohol
as compensation for special domestic warehousing fees." The Nicholas Court
found that although these allowances may not have constituted a bounty, they
did constitute a grant. The Court stated,
If the word "bounty" has a limited sense the word "grant" has not. A
word of broader significance than "grant" could not have been used.
Like its synonyms "give" and "bestow," it expresses a concession, the
conferring of something by one person upon another. And if the
"something" be conferred by a country "upon the exportation of an
article or merchandise" a countervailing duty is required ...."
This language in Nicholas indicates a decision by the Supreme Court that any
concession whatsoever granted by a country on goods exported must be coun-
tervailed. Additionally, the Nicholas Court read Downs as holding the remission
of the Russian taxes to be an impermissible indirect bounty." If any confu-
sion existed over the Court's interpretation of the countervailing duty statute
in Downs, this confusion should have been resolved by the Nicholas Court's
reading of Downs. After Nicholas it became clear that the Court intended any
remission of indirect taxes by a foreign government to require a countervail-
ing duty."
E. The Resulting Conflict
It thus appears that the different branches of government were in con-
flict over the interpretations of the countervailing duty statute. The enacting
Congress and the Treasury Department viewed the statute as exempting
nonexcessive remissions of taxes from countervailing duties, while the pre-
Zenith courts maintained that any remission must be countervailed. In addi-
tion, the continued reenactment of the original statute—the countervailing
duty statute has been re-enacted five times since 1897 72 — failed to resolve this
conflict. Throughout this time period, there has been virtually no change in
the relevant language and no effort to further define the term bounty. None
of these actions provide any definite congressional endorsement of either the
judicial interpretation or the administrative practice. Further, congressional
action taken subsequent to the judicial decisions in Downs and Nicholas, is
equally inconclusive. Congress in 1950 failed to adopt a Treasury sponsored
" Id. at 36-37.
69 Id. at 39.
7° Id. at 41.
71 In a press conference in 1975, Assistant Secretary MacDonald of the Trea-
sury Department conceded the validity of this interpretation of Downs and Nicholas. He
stated,
There are two ancient Supreme Court Cases—Nicholas and Downs — in
which the Supreme Court stated—this is going back to, I believe, the first
and second decades of the 20th Century, in which the Supreme Court
stated that the remission of indirect taxes on Russian sugar and of some
other product that I cannot think of right now, did, indeed, constitute a
bounty or grant.
Unified Appendix 78, 81.
72 See note 35 supra.
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amendment that would have defined bounty according to the Treasury in-
terpretation. 73 The Senate Finance Committee, however, also was informed
in 1968 of the Treasury's failure to enforce the Downs interpretation; 74 yet
Congress took no action to expressly include nonexcessive remissions, within
the scope of the Tariff Act. Similarly, while Congress responded to the con-
cerns of domestic manufacturers in 1974 by granting a right to appeal ad-
verse Treasury determinations as to countervailing duty petitions to the
District Court," Congress did not act in 1973 regarding the Treasury De-
partment's failure to act on Zenith's petition, after being prompted to do
so by manufacturing spokesmen."
No clear policy choice, no definite endorsement of either the adminstra-
Live or the judicial position can be determined from these congressional acts
and failures to act in the years subsequent to the original legislative history.
The original interpretations reached by the Treasury and the Court, there-
fore, continued in their original conflicting positions, unaffected by the sub-
sequent legislative actions. The conflict contained in these interpretations had
to be resolved.
II. JUDICIAL ACCEPTANCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE INTERPRETATIONS
A.t
 The Zenith Decision
In Zenith, the Supreme Court resolved any ambiguity regarding the re-
mission of indirect taxes by upholding the Treasury interpretation that solely
" H.R. 8304, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., § 2 (1950). Section 2 of the proposed
amendment would have added the following language to section 303 of the Tariff Act
of 1930:
The exemption of any exported article or merchandise from a duty or tax
imposed on like articles or merchandise when destined for consumption in
the country of origin or exportation, or the refunding of such a duty or
tax, shall not be deemed to constitute a payment or bestowal of a bounty or
grant within the meaning of this section,.
Id.
74
 In 1968, the Senate Committee on Finance conducted extensive hearings to
review United States trade policy. In the course of these hearings, representatives of
various domestic industries stressed that the Supreme Court's decision in Downs was
not followed by the Treasury Department. E.g., Review of United States Trade Policy:
Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Finance, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 564, 568-69 (1968)
(statement of the National Livestock Feeders Association); id. at 887-89 (statement of
the United States Olive Producers and Importers).
75
 Section 331(b) of the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 1516(d) (1976).
" Proposed Amendments to the Tariff Act of 1930: Hearings on H.R. 6767 Before the
House Committee on Ways and Means, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 3292-93 (1973). The Commit-
tee was informed of Zenith's petition by Frank D. Langstroth, Vice President for Legis-
lative Affairs of the Magnavox Company. Mr. Langstroth sent recommendations to
Rep. Wilbur Mills otr June 14, 1973 in which he stated,
The Zenith case represents an outrageous disregard of the Congres-
sional mandate. Zenith first filed its countervailing duty complaint in April
1970. ... For approximately two years Treasury failed to conduct even a
cursory investigation—while thousands of American workers in the elec-
tronics industry lost their jobs as domestic production rapidly declined, ...
Treasury finally initiated an investigation, but that investigation has since
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excessive remissions of indirect taxes are to be countervailed." In reaching
this decision, the Court first noted that the Treasury Department has inter-
preted the countervailing duty statute to exclude nonexcessive remissions
since the statute was first enacted." The Court stated that great deference is
due to Treasury interpretations since the Department is responsible for the
administration of the statute. The Court concluded in this connection, that
the Treasury interpretation should be upheld unless found to be unreason-
able. 79
The Court then examined the reasonableness of the Treasury interpreta-
tion by considering the language and legislative history of the original statute.
In so doing, the Court considered the earlier countervailing duty
provisions—especially the 1894 language exempting nonexcessive
remissions—important in determining the meaning of the 1897 "net" bounty
language." The Zenith Court considered Senator Allison's statements regard-
ing the 1897 change," and the use of identical figures in describing the oper-
ation of the law by both proponents and opponents of the amendment sig-
nificant in construing the statute. 82 The Court determined that these factors
were persuasive, and therefore rejected the possibility that the deletion of the
1894 language was intended to eliminate the exemption for nonexcessive re-
missions." Accordingly, on the basis of the legislative history, the Court de-
termined that the express definitional limit contained in the 1894 statute was
intended by Congress to apply to the 1897 "net" bounty language. 84
Having concluded that the language and legislative history of the Tariff
Act of 1897 supported the Treasury Department interpretation, the Court
next determined that the interpretation was equally consistent with the statu-
tory purpose to eliminate unfair competitive advantage for foreign export-
ers. 85 The Court agreed with the reasoning of the Treasury Department
regarding the dangers of double taxation stating, "(Obis intuitively appealing
principle regarding double taxation had been widely accepted both in this
country and abroad for many years prior to the enactment of the 1897 stat-
ute." 86 In addition, the Court noted that since the Treasury Department
participated in drafting the 1897 statute, the Department was well suited to
interpret the statute according to its purpose. Indeed this factor gave addi-
tional weight to the reasonableness of the Department's position."
languished and no action has been taken to offset the subsidy element con-
tained in imports of Japanese television sets.
Id.
77 437 U.S. at 447, 449,
78 Id. at 450.
79 Id. at 450-51.
BO
 Id. at 451-53.
8 ' See text and notes at notes 46-48 supra.
82 437 U.S. at 453-55.
83 Id. at 452-53.
84 Id. at 453.
85 Id. at 455-56.
86 Id. at 457.
87 Id. at 456.
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The Court concluded its examination of the reasonableness of the Trea-
sury interpretation by considering the relationship between that interpretation
and continual congressional re-enactment of the statute with virtualy no
change in the language. 88
 In this regard, the Court stated, "whether or not
Congress can be said to have `acquiesed' in the adminstrative practice, it. cer-
tainly has not acted to change it." 89 The Court, therefore, saw no cause to
find the Treasury practice unreasonable."
The Court concluded is consideration of Zenith's petition by recognizing
that even if the Treasury interpretation was reasonable, supported by the
legislative history and uncontradicted by subsequent congressional action, this
interpretation must fall before any contrary judicial interpretations." In this
regard, the Court considered its decision in Downs v. United States." The
Court found that the language in Downs, expressly prohibiting any remission
of indirect taxes," was inconsistent with other language in the opinion that
suggested only excessive remissions were bounties." The Zenith Court de-
termined that the repeated use in Downs of the figures representing only a
fraction of the full benefit bestowed on the exporter outweighed the single
reference to the effect that all benefits are subject to the countervailing duty
provision. The Zenith Court concluded that only the certificates, representing
the excessive portion of the remission in Downs, were impermissible boun-
ties." The Court unanimously ruled, therefore, that Downs was consistent
with the Treasury Department interpretation, and, accordingly, that defer-
ence would be shown to the reasonable Treasury interpretation.
B. Validity of the Court's Reasoning
The Court's decision in Zenith, exempting nonexcessive remissions from
the statute's coverage, represents a proper interpretation of the countervailing
duty statute. The Court's reasoning, however, is not totally convincing. Al-
though the Court's examination of the legislative intent and the deference
due to reasonable Treasury Department practices demonstrates sound judicial
interpretation, the treatment of judicial precedent is less persuasive. The
weakness in the treatment of judicial interpretations becomes apparent in the
88 Id. at 457. See note 35 supra.
89 Id. at 457.
99 The Court also noted that the Secretary's position has been incorporated
into the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which is followed by every
major trading nation in the world." Id. at 457. The Court considered the provisions of
the GATT relevant to its inquiry because it believed that foreign tax systems may have
been structured around the belief that nonexcessive remissions of indirect taxes would
not be countervailed under United States tariff laws. Id.
91 Id. at 459.
92 187 U.S. 496 (1903).
93 See text at note 59 supra.
94 See text at note 61 supra.
95 Id. Speaking of the language in Downs, which broadly prohibits any remis-
sion of indirect taxes, the Court stated: "This passage is inconsistent with both preced-
ing and subsequent language which suggests that the [Downs] Court understood the
'bounty' to reside in the value of the certificates." Id. at 461.
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Court's failure to recognize the judicial precedent contrary to the Treasury
interpretation established in Downs and carried forward in the lower court
decisions. While confusion in the Downs opinion is quite understandable, given
the seemingly inconsistent sections of that opinion," several considerations
previously noted reveal that both of the aspects of the tax scheme in question
were deemed impermissible bounties by the Court in Downs. These consider-
ations include the fact that the figures used in Downs were never at issue in the
case, that the Supreme Court in Downs affirmed lower court decisions that
expressly found both aspects of the Russian scheme to be impermissible boun-
ties,97 and that the Supreme Court had subsequently interpreted Downs as
forbidding the remission of indirect taxes." These considerations show that,
properly read, Downs prohibits any remission of indirect taxes. The Court in
Zenith, therefore, improperly relied on the Downs decision to support its prop-
osition that solely excessive remissions are to be countervailed.
The weakness in the treatment of judicial precedent also is apparent in
the Zenith Court's treatment of Nicholas." The only mention of Nicholas in
Zenith is contained in a footnote that distinguishes the facts - of that case from
those in Zenith."° The Zenith Court determined that language in Nicholas that
calls for a broad interpretation of the statute in response to direct bounties
could not be applied to the question whether the remission of a consumption
tax—an indirect bounty—must be countervailed.'°'
The Zenith Court's characterization of Nicholas as referring only to direct
bounties ignores the scope of the language used therein. The Nicholas Court,
in introducing its discussion of the meaning to be attributed to the term
grant, quoted the language from the countervailing duty statute which pro-
vides that "rwlhenever any country 'shall pay or bestow directly, or indirectly,
any bounty or grant ... " 102 a countervailing duty will be assessed. Further,
the court in Nicholas referred only to United States v. Passavant, "3 and Downs
and claimed that both of these cases, which dealt with indirect bounties, sup-
ported its conclusion as to the meaning of the term grant.'" The Zenith
Court, therefore, erroneously limited the Nicholas decision to situations involv-
96 Id. at 459.
97 See text and notes at notes 62-63 supra.
98 Nicholas & Co. v. United States, 249 U.S. 34, 41 (1919).
" 249 U.S. 34 (1919), See text and notes at notes 65-71 supra.
100 437 U.S. at 459 n.15.
101 Id.
992 Nicholas, 249 U.S. at 39 (emphasis added).
1 " 169 U.S. 16 (1898).
104 249 U.S. at 40-41. Passavant, which dealt with a domestic tax remission, was
quoted by the Nicholas Court for the proposition that "the laws of this country in the
assessment of duties proceed upon the market value in the exporting country and not
upon that market value less such remission or amelioration as that country chooses to
allow in accordance with its own views of public policy." Id. The Nicholas Court cited
Downs as involving both direct and indirect bounties. Id. at 41. The Nicholas Court's
reliance on decisions involving the remissions of indirect taxes indicates its view that
such remissions are, along with direct bounties subject to identical analysis under the
countervailing duty provisions.
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ing direct bounties. Both the Nicholas and Downs decisions, provide judicial
precedent contrary to the Treasury Department's interpretation of the stat-
ute.'" The Court in Zenith is not persuasive in its consideration of the
Downs holding and in its failure to consider the Nicholas decision.
This weakness in the interpretation of judicial precedent, however, does
not alter the validity of the Court's decision. In order to reconcile the oppos-
ing interpretations, the Court should have looked to the authority attributed
to each branch's interpretation and to the clarity with which the interpretation
is demonstrated. The Treasury interpretation has been very clear and consis-
tent. The Department has explicitly stated that nonexcessive remissions are
not covered under the statute.'" Although the congresssional intent is not as
clear, it has been shown that the enacting Congress also supported the Trea-
sury interpretation.'" The reviewing courts, therefore, should have deferred
to the interpretation followed by the Treasury. This interpretation was consis-
tent with that of Congress and was a reasonable means of achieving the stat-
ute's intended purpose. Prior to Zenith, however, the courts did not defer to
the Treasury, and the Zenith Court was faced with judicial precedent contrary
to the administrative practice.'" In this position, the Court should have rec-
ognized the error contained in its earlier decisions and upheld the original
intent as announced by the Treasury Department.'"
III. THE NEED FOR REFORM
A. The Problem
Although the Zenith Court properly interpreted the countervailing duty
statute, the more important issue in this analysis is whether the statute is
achieving its intended purpose of eliminating unfair competitive advantages
between domestic and foreign goods. Consideration of this question shows
that the statute does not fulfill its intended purpose. As will be shown in this
section, nonexcessive remissions of indirect taxes do, in fact, give rise to un-
fair competitive advantages. The statute's failure to correct this imbalance
thus indicates a need for legislative reform.
The Treasury Department's present refusal to assess duties for the
nonexcessive remissions of indirect taxes is based on the theory that to do so
would result in double taxation."° This double taxation analysis is premised
on the assumption that direct taxes are borne entirely by the manufacturer,
'0$ The practical result of the Court's interpretation is the same as it would
have been had the Court expressly recognized the conflict. Downs and Nicholas can no
longer be cited as binding precedent supporting the proposition that a nonexcessive
remission must he countervailed.
`°° See note 50 supra.
107 See text at notes 45-48 supra.
1 ° 8 See text at note 96 supra.
100 Although the Court did not follow this procedure, and erroneously inter-
preted the prior precedent, the error does not materially affect the validity of the
Court's holding. Under the present statute the Treasury Department and the Court
correctly denied Zenith's petition.
"° See text at note 51 supra.
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whereas indirect taxes are borne entirely by the consumer. Theoretically, "an
indirect tax is always passed on to the consumer in the form of higher price
(shifted), whereas all direct taxes are absorbed entirely by the factors of pro-
duction in the form of lower wages or reduced dividends."" 1 Under this
theory, remission of a direct tax would clearly constitute a bounty in that its
sole benefit would run to the manufacturer and _would thereby encourage
export. Because of the remission the manufacturer would face a lower cost of
production, and would be able to offer higher wages or gain greater profits.
On the other hand, remission of an indirect tax levied on the sale of the item
theoretically would not benefit the manufacturer. Rather, it would only re-
move from consumers the unfair burden of double taxation—paying a sales
tax for both the country of manufacture and the country of consumption.
The Treasury Department has concluded that it would not violate the statute's
intended purpose of prohibiting benefits to manufacturers to exempt con-
sumers from this double taxation burden.
The validity of this analysis depends on a clear separation between direct
and indirect taxes. It is essential that only manufacturers benefit from remis-
sions of direct taxes and only consumers be affected by remissions of indirect
taxes because, if this separation is not maintained, the distinction between di-
rect and indirect taxes would be meaningless. In the present market system,
however, assuming this clear separation is unjustified. Manufacturers do not
necessarily absorb the burden of direct taxes by reducing profits or by paying
lower wages. Rather, they often pass much of this burden on to the con-
sumer.'" Similarly, indirect taxes are not borne entirely by the consumer,
since a manufacturer will often absorb some of this cost by offering the prod-
uct at a reduced price in order to encourage sales." 3 In interpreting the
applicability of the countervailing duty provision, therefore, the Treasury De-
partment's justification for distinguishing between direct and indirect taxes—
to avoid double taxation of the consumer—is not persuasive.
The double taxation theory erroneously assumes that the manufacturer
alone is affected by the levying of direct taxes. This theory fails to take into
account that when the manufacturer passes on the cost of direct taxes to the
consumer, the consumer also is affected. In these instances, despite the
Treasury Department intent of avoiding double taxation for consumers, the
consumer will pay two taxes—the direct taxes of the manufacturing country
and the indirect taxes of the country of sale. It thus appears that the facts do
Butler, Countervailing Duties and Export Subsidization: A Re-emerging Issue in
International Trade, 9 VA. J. INT'L LAW 82, 113 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Butler). This
theoretical construction of the tax system is also the basis for the policy toward remis-
sions of taxes contained in Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
Id. at 113-14.
112 The manufacturer will often raise the price of the item in order to compen-
sate for the direct taxes and ensure profits. This practice is especially widespread
where the manufacturer holds a strong market position. Id. at 114-15.
113
 The manufacturer in a sharply competitive market may reduce the price of
the item, thereby reducing the profit from each item sold, in order to maintain or
increase the manufacturer's share of the market. Id.
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not support the Treasury claim that permitting remissions of indirect taxes
will avoid the imposition of two sets of taxes on the consumer.
In addition, the assumption that the remission of indirect taxes will ben-
efit only consumers is without merit. Manufacturers also benefit. The error
of this position becomes particularly apparent when a comparison is drawn
between profits derived from domestic as opposed to export sales. In the case
of the manufacturer who is engaged in stiff competition and who has ab-
sorbed some of the indirect taxes by reducing prices, the removal of the indi-
rect tax cost will restore the original profit margin. This will only be true,
however, for exported goods where the tax is remitted. The tax will remain
on the goods sold domestically. The manufacturer therefore may gain greater
profits by increased exports. In the case of the manufacturer in a strong mar-
ket position where there is less competitive pressure to lower prices, the re-
mission of the tax will only benefit the consumers to the extent that the man-
ufacturer is willing to roll back the price. The manufacturer not faced with
competitive pressures may decide to deduct only a portion of the full amount
remitted from the sales price, thereby increasing the profits from export
sales." 4 The manufacturer, therefore, often may benefit from the remission
of indirect taxes.
The Treasury Department's theory regarding which remissions are pro-
hibited by the countervailing duty statute ignores not only the actual effects of
indirect and direct taxes on the market, but also disregards the varying
schemes of taxation utilized by exporting countries. The Treasury analysis
ignores the fact that different nations place different emphasis on direct and
indirect taxes in their taxation systems." 5 The small number of nations, such
" 4 In hearings before the House Ways and Means Committee, remarks dealing
with this issue were submitted by Stanley S. Surrey, Assistant Secretary of the Trea-
sury. Mr. Surrey stated:
If sales taxes or other indirect taxes—whether they be value-added,
turnover, retail or other tax forms—cannot be fully passed on in price,
then a manufacturer selling in his domestic market must lower his prices
and reduce his profits. But if the full rebate of the tax cost and the exemp-
tion of exports from the tax make it unnecessary to change his export
prices, then he is not concerned about passing anything along on an export
sale, he need not lower his export price, and his export profits would not
suffer as would his domestic profits. The business of exporting becomes
that much more attractive, and the sales tax system has become an incen-
tive to export activity.
Foreign Trade and Tariff Proposals: Hearings Before the House Committee on Ways and
Means, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 64 (1968).
"3 Marks and Malmgren, supra note 31 at 352. The Common Market countries
have emphasized the indirect tax through the use of the value added tax (VAT).
These nations have been increasing their reliance on the value added tax and reducing
direct taxation as they have moved to a more uniform tax system. Butler, supra note
111 at 112. Richard W. Lindholm, Professor of Finance and Dean of the Graduate
School of Management and Business at the University of Oregon noted in remarks
submitted to the House Ways and Means Committee that "[The Common Market] is
well on its way to establishing a common VAT. Under the rules of GATT the VAT
possess the capability of providing a powerful export stimulus through rebate to the
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as the United States, that place greater emphasis on direct rather than indi-
rect taxes and derive a greater percentage of their revenue from direct taxes
are placed at a competitive disadvantage when indirect taxes alone are permit-
ted to be remitted. The manufacturers in strong direct tax nations are forced
to offer their goods at a higher price than manufacturers in those nations that
have a lower direct tax rate and have their indirect taxes remitted without
fear of being countervailed." 6
 These two factual weaknesses in the Treasury
analysis—the error of the double taxation theory and the differences between
tax systems—demonstrate that reform of the present countervailing duty
provision is needed.
The need for reform has not gone unnoticed. Articles " 7 and statements
before congressional Committees 18 have highlighted the present need. In-
deed, David R. MacDonald, Assistant Secretary for Enforcement Operations
and Tariff Affairs for the Treasury Department has stated that the economic
argument offered in opposition to the practice of allowing nonexcessive indi-
rect tax remissions is sound.'" It is clear, then, that more congressional con-
sideration of this issue is necessary.
exporter of all tax attributable to the production of the product exported." Foreign
Trade and Tariff Proposals: Hearings Before the House Committee on Ways and Means, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1708 (1968).
"6 The inequity contained in this system is compounded when United States
products imported into nations that rely on indirect taxes are levied with a border tax
equal to the amount of the indirect tax imposed on similar products manufactured in
the importing nation. In this instance the American products reach the foreign market
with a higher direct tax rate imposed by the United States and a high indirect tax rate
imposed by the country of import. Marks and Malmgren, supra note 31 at 352.
17 Marks and Malmgren, Negotiating Nontariff Distortions to Trade, 7 LAw &
POCY INT'L Bus. 327 (1975); Butler, Countervailing Duties and Export Subsidization: A
Re-emerging Issue in International Trade, 9 VA. J. INT'L LAw 82 (1969).
"8 Foreign Trade and Tariff Proposals: Hearings Before the House Committee on Ways
and Means, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 1639-43 (1968) (statement of William A. Dymsza,
Research Director, International Business Institute, Graduate School of Business Ad-
ministration, Rutgers University); id. at 1723-27 (statement of the National Association
of Manufacturers); id. at 2863-64 (statement of Philip O. Geier, Jr., of the Machine
Tool Builders Association); id. at 3697 (brief of the General Electric Company); id. at
4335 (statement of Herman K. Intemann of the Union Carbide Corp.).
19 In a press briefing on October 20. 1975 regarding the denial of a United
States Steel countervailing duty request, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Mac-
Donald said,
I just want to make this additional point: The fact that we have not found
the remission of value-added taxes to be a bounty or grant within the
meaning of our law, does not mean that the United States Government is
wild about other taxes of this sort. In fact, if there was one thing that was
quite persuasive in the petition by U.S. Steel, it was their economic argu-
ment that, in filet, there should be no distinction between direct and indi-
rect taxes. ... ['Me distinction between so-called "direct" taxes and so-
called "indirect" taxes, economically speaking, may well be chimerical.
Unified Appendix at 80.
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B. The Alternatives
It would appear that Congress is faced with two alternatives to resolve the
present imbalance in tax treatment. Congress can reform our tax laws to con-
form more closely to the tax systems used in Japan and many of the Euro-
pean nations with which the United States carries on a substantial level of
trade. Although the long term merit of this alternative is beyond the scope of
this article, it seems clear that such reform would require substantial study
and in any event could not be implemented in the foreseeable future. The
present problem requires more immediate attention than could be afforded in
a major revision of our tax system. Even if a longterm shift to emphasizing
indirect taxes would provide a better tax structure for the future, it would not
provide an effective remedy for the current trade advantages problem. The
remaining alternative left to Congress is to tax remissions of indirect taxes.
This is the proposal that has been favored by many manufacturing spokes-
men. 120
A change in the domestic legislation alone, however, will not be sufficient
to remedy the problem. The dichotomy between direct and indirect taxes has
been incorporated into the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, to
which the United States is a party.121
 Article VT(4) of the GATT provides
that nations, parties to the agreement will not assess countervailing duties in
response to the remission of indirect taxes.' 22 Accordingly, in order to fulfill
its obligations under this international agreement, the United States will have
to re-negotiate the GATT provisions dealing with subsidies.
The need for reform is great enough to warrant this legislative and dip-
lomatic action. Although it cannot be determined as an exact percentage,
American manufacturers cite the unfair tax advantages as a contributing fac-
tor in the deterioration of the United States' share of the world market.' 23
Congress and the Executive most certainly will not ignore this problem that
threatens the health of the American economy. In addition, the matter is of
sufficient importance to the United States to require the cooperation of other
nations in reaching a fair resolution of the problem.'"
120
 See note I 18 supra .
121
 See note 26 supra.
122 61 Stat. A24 (1947).
123
 A statement by Joseph S. Wright, Chairman of the Board of the Zenith
Radio Corporation was submitted to the Zenith Court. In his statement Mr. Wright
noted that the United States manufacturer's share of the American electronics market
has declined dramatically.. Unified Appendix at 55-56.
124
 The United States has ben involved in negotiations in a Working Party of
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development nations, formed to
consider the problem. However, no resolution of the problem in these negotiations has
been reached as of yet. In addition, the Multinational Trade Negotiations agreed in
Geneva, Switzerland on proposed International Codes for interpreting the provisions
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade on April 12, 1979. The Sub-Group
on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties proposed that countervailing duties be im-
posed only in the event of injury to the domestic industry and subsidy to the foreign
exporter. The Subgroup also proposed that in no event will the countervailing duty
imposed exceed the amount of the subsidy deemed to exist. In a footnote to this
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IV. CONCLUSION
Prior to the Court's decision in Zenith a conflict existed regarding the
interpretation of the countervailing duty statute. The Treasury Department,
responsible for administering the statute, interpreted the countervailing duty
provision as exempting nonexcessive remissions of indirect taxes. Early Su-
preme Court decisions, on the other hand, concluded that any remission of a
tax requires the levying of a countervailing duty. The Court in Zenith resolved
this ambiguity concerning the meaning of the statute by upholding the Trea-
sury Department interpretation. The Court noted that the Department's in-
terpretation was reasonable given the purpose and legislative history of the
statute. Although the Court did not recognize the conflict presented by the
two earlier Supreme Court decisions, this weakness does not materially affect
the validity of the decision. Had the Court recognized the conflict, it properly
could have noted the deference due to the clear and reasonable interpretation
of the Treasury Department and overruled the improper earlier decisions.
The countervailing duty statute, correctly interpreted, does not require a duty
for the nonexcessive remission of an indirect tax.
Despite the correct statutory interpretation reached by the Court, the
Zenith decision demonstrates factual weaknesses in the statute. The counter-
vailing duty statute is intended to elimate unfair competitive advantages aris-
ing by means of foreign subsidies of their exports. As it is now written and
interpreted, the present statute fails to achieve this purpose. Nonexcessive
remissions of indirect taxes do give rise to competitive advantages. In order to
alleviate this weakness in the statute, the countervailing duty provision should
be re-written to respond to the present market conditions. In addition, the
GATT provisions which permit nonexcessive remissions of indirect taxes
should be re-negotiated. In this way, a fairer and more balanced market sys-
tem can be achieved.
JOHN T. LILLIS
section, the proposed agreement states, "An understanding among signatories should
be developed setting out the criteria for the calculation of the amount of the subsidy."
Multilateral Trade Negotiations: International Codes Agreed to in Geneva, Switzer-
land, Joint Committee Print of the Committee on Ways and Means and the Committee
on Finance, 96th Cong. 1st Sess., p. 11 fn. '2. In the "Subsidies/Countervailing Mea-
sures" section of the proposed agreement a subsidy or bounty is defined as "[Ohe
exemption or remission in respect of the production and distribution of exported prod-
ucts, of indirect taxes in excess of those levied in respect of the production and
distribution of like products when sold for domestic consumption." Id. at Annex (g) p.
39. It thus appears that resolution of the problem is yet to be achieved.
